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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Shayna Schnakenburg entered a conditional plea of guilty to a single count of possession

of methamphetamine after the district court denied her motion to suppress. Ms. Schnakenburg
argues the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress as the search of her purse
violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as the search
was conducted without a warrant or a viable exception to the warrant requirement. Due to that
unlawful search, Ms. Schnakenburg respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s
order denying her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand her case
for further proceedings.

B.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Just after midnight on February 13, 2018, Officer Garret Bowman of the Pocatello Police

Department was travelling east on Maple Street in Pocatello near the area of 300 Washington
Avenue. (R., p.18; Bowman Video, 00:21.)1 As he turned south from Maple Street onto
Washington Avenue, a vehicle traveling north on Washington Avenue was stopping at the
intersection. (MtS Tr., p.22, Ls.22-23; Bowman Video, 00:27.) Officer Bowman initiated a Uturn and headed north, stopping at the intersection with Maple Street. (Bowman Video, 00:30–
00:42.) When Officer Bowman stopped at the intersection, the other vehicle was pulled over to
the right-hand curb. (MtS Tr., p.23, Ls.14-16; Bowman Video, 00:44.) By the time Officer
1

The video of the stop was admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 1 during the Motion to Suppress and
will be cited as “Bowman Video.” (see MtS Tr., p.39, Ls.18-19.) A Motion to Augment with that
video has been filed simultaneously with this brief. Transcripts for the Mart 7, 2019 Motion to
Suppress hearing will be cited as “MtS Tr.” Citations to the August 12, 2019 Change of Plea
hearing transcript will be cited as “CoP Tr.” Citations to the October 15, 2019 sentencing hearing
will be cited as “Sent. Tr.”
1

Bowman crossed the intersection, the other vehicle was stopped, its lights were off, and the
driver was exiting the vehicle. (MtS Tr., p.23, Ls.18 – p.24, L.1; Bowman Video, 00:56.) When
Officer Bowman turned on his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop, the driver’s door was
closed and the driver was no longer in view of his patrol vehicle’s camera. (Bowman Video,
01:01.) Officer Bowman exited his patrol vehicle and contacted the driver of the vehicle.
(R., p.19; Bowman Video, 01:20; MtS Tr., p.24, Ls.18-22.) The driver, later identified as
Ms. Schnakenburg, returned to where Officer Bowman is standing and can clearly be seen
carrying her purse. (Bowman Video, 01:33.) Officer Bowman directed her to the front of his
vehicle and began talking with her, informing her of the reason he was stopping her. (MtS
Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.25, L.12; Bowman Video, 01:41-3:15.)
While Officer Bowman and Ms. Schnakenburg are talking, another officer, later
identified as Officer Eborn of the Pocatello Police Department, arrived on scene. (MtS Tr., p.25,
Ls.12-21; Bowman Video, 02:52.) Officer Bowman then began filling out citations for an invalid
driver’s license and failing to provide proof of insurance. (MtS Tr., p.27, Ls.8-10.) Around this
time, Officer Eborn requested a drug detection canine unit be dispatched to their location. (MtS
Tr., p.26, Ls.16-18.) Officer Shane Jones of the Pocatello Police Department arrived on scene
with his canine, Jaco, about fourteen minutes after the stop was initiated. (R., p.19; MtS
Tr., p.28, Ls.6-19; Bowman Video, 13:49.) Jaco conducted a sniff and alerted while inside the
vehicle. (R., p.19; Bowman Video, 13:52-14:5.)
After Jaco alerted, officers searched the vehicle, but did not find any contraband.
(R., p.19; MtS Tr., p.29, Ls.4-7; Bowman Video, 15:32 -20:51.) During the search, Officer
Bowman commented that he believed Ms. Schnakenburg and her passenger “have it on them.”
(Bowman Video, 17:42.) Officer Bowman then took Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse. (R., p.19; MtS
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Tr., p.29, Ls.7-24; Bowman Video, 20:54.) One of the other officers on scene asked Officer
Bowman, “Did you search that purse?” (Bowman Video, 21:06.) Another officer said, “It was in
the car.” (Bowman Video, 21:06.) Officer Bowman replied, while pointing down the street,
“Well, she got out though. She was by that fence down there by the time I contacted her.”
(Bowman Video, 21:18.) He also told the officers that he “didn’t see the purse on her when she
came out of the car,” contrasting his later testimony during the suppression hearing. (Bowman
Video, 21:29; cf., Tr., p.29, Ls.16-24 (stating that “she had [the purse] on her when she exited the
vehicle.”).) One of the other officers then told him, “You still need to search it.” (Bowman
Video, 21:34.) Officer Bowman replied, “OK, just making sure,” went back to his patrol vehicle,
and searched Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse. (Bowman Video, 21:35–26:01; R., p.19, MtS Tr., p.29,
Ls.7-24.) During the search, Officer Bowman found suspected drug paraphernalia. (R., p.19;
MtS Tr., p.29, L.25 – p.31, L.3; Bowman Video, 23:16.) Officer Eborn then tested the
paraphernalia with a presumptive positive result for heroin. (R., p.19; MtS Tr., p.31, Ls.4-8.)
Ms. Schnakenburg was placed under arrest for possession of heroin. (R., p.19; MtS Tr., p.31,
Ls.9-11; Bowman Video, 33:19.) When Ms. Schnakenburg was processed into the Bannock
County jail, a pipe and baggie with suspected methamphetamine was found. (R., p.19; MtS
Tr., p.32, Ls.7-20.)
An Information was filed with charging Ms. Schnakenburg with one count of felony
possession of heroin and one count of felony possession of methamphetamine, along with an
Information Part II with an enhancement for a second or subsequent drug offense. (R., pp.59-62.)
Ms. Schnakenburg filed a Motion to Suppress and a Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Suppress asserting that her right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated
when her purse was searched without a warrant. (R., pp.82-84, 105-16.).) The State filed a brief
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in opposition asserting that it did not matter when Ms. Schnakenburg exited the vehicle with her
purse as it was a container that had been removed from the vehicle and could searched under the
automobile exception. (R., pp.117-23.) The court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, finding that, because the canine alerted on the vehicle
she had been driving, the automobile exception applied and the search of her purse was allowed
as it was a container that had been in the vehicle. (R., pp.126-35.)
Ms. Schnakenburg entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine,
preserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.153-54; CoP Tr., p.6,
Ls.6-8, p.10, Ls.17-20.) The State agreed to dismiss the possession of heroin, the subsequent
offense enhancement, and to “concur with the PSI recommending no more than a rider.” (CoP
Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11.) The district court accepted Ms. Schnakenburg’s conditional guilty plea. (CoP
Tr., p.10, Ls.9-15.)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Schnakenburg asked that she be placed on probation.
(Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.17-21.) The State concurred in the recommendation from the presentence
investigation report (“PSI”), that the court retain jurisdiction. (Sent. Tr., p.18, Ls.1-3; PSI, p.18.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (Sent. Tr., p.19, Ls.23-25.) Ms. Schnakenburg timely appealed from the Judgment
of Conviction. (R., pp.174-75.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Schnakenburg’s motion to suppress as her rights under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when her purse was
searched without a warrant, or viable exception to the warrant requirement?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Schnakenburg’s Motion To Suppress As Her Rights
Under The Fourth Amendment To The United States Constitution Were Violated When Her
Purse Was Searched Without A Warrant, Or Viable Exception To The Warrant Requirement

A.

Introduction
The district court should have granted Ms. Schnakenburg’s Motion to Suppress because

Officer Bowman’s search of her purse did not fall within the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment, and Officer Bowman failed to obtain a warrant prior to executing the search of
Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse. Due to the unlawful search, Ms. Schnakenburg submits the district
court should have granted her motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept the trial court’s
findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis,
155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The Search of Ms. Schnakenburg’s Purse Was Illegal Because The Automobile
Exception To The Fourth Amendment Did Not Apply And Ms. Schnakenburg’s Purse
Was Searched Without A Warrant
In her motion to suppress, Ms. Schnakenburg argued “[t]he probable cause created by

the dog sniff is linked to the vehicle; [and] that probable cause does not magically transfer to any
or all container/s that may have been in it previously.” (R., pp.113-15.) The State, in its
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opposition to the motion, argued that when the container was removed from the vehicle doesn't
matter – essentially, as long as the container was in the vehicle at some point, it’s free game to
search. (R., pp.121-22.) The court agreed with the State and found that, because the canine
alerted “on the vehicle near the area seat [sic] where [Ms. Schnakenburg] was while driving,”
and “the purse carried by [Ms. Schnakenburg] was a container in the vehicle,” it was “subject to
search according to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (R., p.134.) However,
in so ruling, Ms. Schnakenburg asserts the district court erred in applying the Court of Appeals
rulings in State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005), and State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173
(Ct. App. 2015).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of every
citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796
(2003) (“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on
probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.”) (citations omitted); See U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. “Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015). The
purpose of these prohibitions is “to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653-54 (1979).
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within “one of several
narrowly drawn exceptions.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012); Katz v. United
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States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such recognized exception the warrant requirement is the
“automobile exception” which “allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Anderson, 154
Idaho at 706. “A dog sniff along the outside of a motor vehicle does not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). Thus, “[a] reliable drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a
vehicle is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the
interior.” Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706. Ms. Schnakenburg does not contest that, after the positive
alert by the canine, the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause. She also agrees
that “[i]f probable cause justiﬁes the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justiﬁes the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Easterday,
159 Idaho at 175; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). She also
acknowledges the container exception “applies to all containers within a vehicle, without
qualiﬁcation as to ownership or the nature of the container and without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each container.” Id. Instead, Ms. Schnakenburg asserts the
district court impermissibly expanded the limited scope of the automobile exception when it
upheld the warrantless search of her purse.
Warrantless searches of an individual, even during a traffic stop, are especially protected
as “[t]here exists a ‘unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one's
person.’” State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999)).
Even a limited personal search intrudes upon cherished personal security and is an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience. Id. The “traumatic
consequences [like those involved in a personal search] are not to be expected
when the police examine an item of personal property found in a car.” Id. Thus,
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personal searches of vehicle occupants are not authorized under the automobile
exception as a result of the occupant's mere presence within a vehicle, which there
is probable cause to search. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1948);
People v. Temple, 36 Cal.App.4th 1219, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 891–92 (1995);
State v. Mitchell, 87 Ohio App.3d 484, 622 N.E.2d 680, 685–86 (1993).
Id.
In addition,“[a] person’s mere proximity to people who are suspected of criminal activity,
or presence in a location where a search has been authorized by warrant, does not give probable
cause to search that person.” Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979)). “Instead, ‘a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause with
respect to that person.’” Id. (emphasis added). “Significantly, all exceptions to the warrant
requirement, including a limited Terry stop, require individualized suspicion.” State v.
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988) (emphasis added). Subjective good faith on the part of the
officer is also not enough to justify a warrantless search of an individual because, “if subjective
good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and
the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion
of the police.’” State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 492-3 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
In denying her motion to suppress, the district court relied on two Court of Appeals cases,
Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, and Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, in holding that the search of
Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse fell within the automobile exception. In Easterday, the Court of
Appeals held that the search of a purse was permissible under the automobile exception.
Easterday, 159 Idaho at 175. While facially similar to Ms. Schnakenburg’s case, there are
significant differences. In Easterday, the defendant “remained in the vehicle during the
deployment of the drug dog” with her purse inside the vehicle with her. Id. at 174. After a
positive alert by the canine, the officer instructed her to “exit the vehicle, and as she did so, she
9

took her purse with her.” Id. A search of her purse then revealed contraband. Id. Similarly, in
Gibson, police conducted a sniff of the defendant’s vehicle while the defendant was still inside
the vehicle. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 280. After the canine alerted, a search of the vehicle “did not
uncover any drugs.” Id. “The officers then searched Gibson's wallet and discovered a small
baggie containing methamphetamine” and arrested him. Id.
However, the Easterday and Gibson courts reached different conclusions despite their
similar facts. In Easterday, the court held that the purse was a container and the search was
allowed because “there are no special containers, and it is immaterial where the container is
located within the vehicle or whether the occupant exited the vehicle with the container.”
Easterday, 159 Idaho at 177. But, in Gibson, the court found that “personal searches of vehicle
occupants are not authorized under the automobile exception as a result of the occupant’s mere
presence within a vehicle, which there is probable cause to search.” Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282
(citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1948) (other citations removed)).
After Jaco alerted on the vehicle, the officers, and the State in its opposition to the motion
to suppress, focused on the fact that Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse had been in the vehicle prior to
the stop. (R., pp.121-23.) However, in both Gibson and Easterday, the defendants were inside
their vehicles during the canine sniffs. See Gibson, 141 Idaho at 427 (“The dog was walked
around the outside of the vehicle while Gibson and the passenger were inside.”); Easterday, 159
Idaho at 174 (“Easterday remained in the vehicle during the deployment of the drug dog.”). Here,
Ms. Schnakenburg was not in the vehicle during the entirety of the stop. (See, generally,
Bowman Video.). Officer Bowman testified that “prior to activating [his] overhead lights,”
Ms. Schnakenburg had exited the vehicle and was “walk[ing] north” away from him. (MtS
Tr., p.23, Ls.19-23; Bowman Video, 00:56–01:01.) The video shows Ms. Schnakenburg carrying
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her purse as she exits the vehicle. (Bowman Video, 00:58-59.) The video also shows that
throughout the stop, until she was arrested, Ms. Schnakenburg waited either in the road between
the two vehicles or on the curb; she never even approached the vehicle after Officer Bowman
began speaking with her. (See generally, Bowman Video, 1:41–33:19.) The Easterday Court
found that her presence in the vehicle where the canine alerted justified the officers search of her
purse even though it was no longer located inside the vehicle. Easterday, 159 Idaho at 177.
Additionally, none of the officers gave any indication that they had more than mere
hunches that Ms. Schnakenburg had contraband in her purse. (See, e.g., Bowman Video, 28:33–
28:36 (“I’m guessing she has it on her.” “That’s my guess, too.”).) While testifying at the
suppression hearing, Officer Bowman confirmed “there was nothing in Miss Schnakenburg’s
behavior that indicated she was using.” (MtS Tr., p.40, L.25 – p.41, L.3; cf., Easterday, 159
Idaho at 174 (discussing how the defendant “became ‘really agitated’” when officers asked to
search her purse”).) He admitted that he did not ask for her consent to search her purse “due to
the fact that the purse was in the vehicle at the time of the stop.” (MtS Tr., p.41, Ls.23-25; see
also p.47, Ls.12-15.) The court also confirmed that Jaco only alerted on the vehicle, not on
Ms. Schnakenburg or any other individual. (MtS Tr., p.47, Ls.1-11.)
Because the search of Ms. Schnakenburg’s purse was conducted without a warrant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must show that
there was another recognized exception that would permit that search, but none of the applicable
exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. There are only a few circumstances where a
warrantless search of a person can be conducted. See Henderson, 114 Idaho at 294-95
(discussing the general constitutional standards of warrantless searches and police encounters).
“A person’s mere proximity to people who are suspected of criminal activity, or presence in a
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location where a search has been authorized by warrant, does not give probable cause to search
that person.” Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283 (citing Ybarra 444 U.S. at 91). Instead, “a search or
seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause with respect to that person.” Id. Here,
the officers had nothing more than Ms. Schnakenburg’s proximity to her passenger, an individual
known by police to have been involved in prior drug crimes,2 and her presence near an area
search – none of which was sufficient to give officers probable cause. The officers also did not
have either a warrant or consent to search the purse.
Accordingly, Ms. Schnakenburg asserts that the search of her purse was illegal, and that
all evidence that flowed from that illegal search, including the evidence found at the jail, should
be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963); accord State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009).

CONCLUSION
Ms. Schnakenburg respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
denying her motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s minute entry and judgment of
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2020.

/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

2

See R., pp.118, 121 (describing the passenger as someone “whom officers had interaction with
on prior occasions,” and as a “known criminal”). See also Mts. Tr., p.49, Ls.20-22 (“Q. And this
passenger has prior drug history? A. Yes.”).
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